Peace-keeping Intervention in Liberia
Peace-keeping Intervention in Liberia
By Ogiri John Ogiri
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
Since the end of the cold war (1948-1989), states and international organizations have repeatedly engaged in Peace-keeping, peace-building and peace-making to help solve international and intra-national problems (Dawson, 2004)
One of the countries which has witnessed protracted intra-national conflicts in Africa is Liberia. Liberia has had Peace-keeping intervention in the course of her civil war years. Hence the choice of the country for this discussion.
Liberia’s civil war began in 1989. Though most violence ended in 1997, renewed clashes in 2003 drew international attention, and led to the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping force to the country. An estimated 150,000 people – one in twenty Liberians – died in the conflict. The fighting involved widespread killing and rape of civilians and forced recruitment of child soldiers.
From Liberia’s founding in 1847, its politics were dominated by Americo-Liberians descendents of former American slaves who resettled in Liberia. In 1980, an indigenous Liberian named Samuel Doe took over the government. Doe mimicked the old regime’s ethnic favoritism on behalf of his own group, the Krahn, and in 1985 former Doe allies staged a coup. When it failed, Doe retaliated by massacring thousands of Gios and Manos, people of the ethnic groups of the coup leaders. Doe’s opponents formed the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). NPFL attempts to oust Doe were ineffectual however, until 1989 when Charles Taylor led an incursion from the northeast, marking the start of the civil war. Taylor had cultivated the external support of Burkina Faso, Libya, and Côte d’Ivoire, and his internal support came mainly from Gios and Manos. After just a few months of fighting, the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) split from Taylor and the NPFL. The INPFL assassinated President Doe in 1990, but fighting continued between Doe’s Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), the NPFL, and the INPFL. Despite a proliferation of armed groups during the war, these remained the three strongest factions. Other groups’ influence lay largely in their abilities to create military stalemates or to spoil peace agreements. Early negotiations were brokered by the regional Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). ECOWAS sent peacekeeping forces to Liberia in 1990, but as there was no peace to keep, the troops became engaged in the fighting themselves. After 1994, the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity took over negotiations. No solid peace agreements were secured, however, until Taylor’s NPFL had attained military dominance and Taylor himself was assured a role in the government. In 1997, Taylor won a landslide victory in internationally validated elections. Liberians were tired of war, and many believed that, had Taylor not been elected, he would have continued fighting. Taylor initially invited opposition groups into the government, but later he cracked down on all dissent. By 1999, a new rebel group formed largely of Krahns and Madingoes, called Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), was regularly engaging Taylor’s army. As a result of Taylor’s support of rebels in neighboring Sierra Leone, and his human rights abuses in Liberia, the United Nations imposed sanctions on Liberia in 2001. In 2003, the Liberian rebels overran the capital, Monrovia, and Taylor took asylum in Nigeria. In November 2005, Ellen Sirleaf-Johnson was elected president, becoming Africa’s first woman head of state. ( Adekeye, 2002: Thomas, 2003: Kwesi, 1997: )
In the light of the foregoing, this work discusses Peace-keeping intervention in Liberia under the following headings
-concept of peace and peacekeeping,
-The Liberian Civil War
Peace-keeping intervention in Liberia
Conclusion
CONCEPT OF PEACE AND PEACE-KEEPING
Peace is often considered as an opposite word of war as symbolised by the famous Russian novel War and Peace written by Leo Tolstoy( Satani, 2003). According to Boulding (1978), stable peace is “a situation in which the probability of war is so small that it does not really enter into the calculations of any of the people involved."
The word ‘peace’ is not often mentioned in a time of peace, but is usually mentioned when war or violent conflict occurs. Nations are making every effort to keep peace by defending their society from the threat of war, violence and terrorism through the building of armaments and armies. In this context, peace is defined negatively as the “absence of war.” For nearly 60 years since the Second World War, there has not been any direct military confrontation among the world’s major powers. Most of the world has been living life in peace in this perspective. However, even when people living in the areas of the ‘absence of war’ are asked whether they are at peace or not, the answer is not always positive. Although peace is regarded verbally as opposite of war, people do not always feel that true peace is achieved. (Satani, 2004)
Some peace researchers have cast doubt on this definition of peace as the ‘absence of war.’ The ‘absence of war’ is a necessary precondition for peace, but is not a sufficient condition for peace. Peace enforced by treaties, agreements or laws are mere temporary states of non-violence, because if the people involved are still inclined towards belligerence, then sooner or later, conflict, violence and wars will start once again.( Ibid, 2004)
Quincy Wright insisted that “peace was a dynamic balance involving political, social, cultural and technological factors, and that war occurred when this balance broke down.”He suggested in 1941 that peace was a more complicated matter than a mere ‘absence of war’ for the first time. Looking at situations in developing countries, where nobody felt peaceful even without war, Sugata Dasgupta named the state of ‘absence of war’ in developing countries ‘peacelessness.’( Smoker & Groff, 1996: Shimbun, 2002)
Even if a war ends and bullets or clubs are not being used, other kinds of violence might be taking place.(Barash, 2000). Some people suffer from diseases that are preventable. Some starve to death although there is enough food on earth. Some are denied a decent education, housing, an opportunity to play, to grow, to work, to raise a family, to have a right to freedom of speech, or to take part in their governance. They would never feel peaceful in such situations where their human rights and dignity are violated. Johan Galtung developed these views and divided peace into two categories: ‘negative peace’ and ‘positive peace.’ Negative peace is defined as nothing more than the absence of physical violence. There still may exist much hostility between the parties, and there is no move towards peace-building. It emphasizes the absence of war and violent conflict within and between societies. Peace is largely understood as a state where there is no war or violence. Negative peace is seen most often at the onset of a United Nations enforced cease-fire. Positive peace, on the other hand, is defined as a situation wherein all the states in former conflict are working together for mutual benefit. It emphasizes the presence of harmony, equity and justice within and between societies. ‘Positive peace’ is achieved when a state of ‘peacelessness’ has been improved. The elements which shape the state of ‘peacelessness’ are termed ‘structural violence.’ Structural violence is often extremely difficult to recognise and understand. It is a structure of exploitation and social injustice which is “built into the very social, political and economic systems that govern societies, states and the world.”(Brand-Jacobsen, 2002) For Galtung, peace is a positive concept which not only indicates absence of direct violence, but also includes a range of relationships up to a state where nations (or any groups and individuals in conflict) have collaborative and supportive relationships by respecting the rights of others, acting justly and taking care of others. Linda Groff and Paul Smoker further developed the concept of peace by categorising peace into six broad stages by historically evolved peace concepts: absence of war; balance of force; no structural violence; feminist peace; holistic Gaia peace; and holistic inner-outer peace.(Smoker & Groff, 1996).
Peace research began with the movement by scientists to avert nuclear war after the Second World War, and has been extending its academic fields. Definition of peace has also been extended. It started from what Galtung calls negative peace, which is concerned only about the relationship between and within states. Extended definitions of peace include much broader area of concern from interpersonal (peace between individuals) and intergroup (peace between communities such as families, neighbourhoods, colleagues at work and ethnic groups) to international (peace between nations), global and environmental (peace between human beings and the rest of the biosphere). Spiritual leaders such as Dalai Lama suggest the significance of inner peace, or spiritual development. He articulates that both material and spiritual development “are important and must be developed side by side so as to achieve good valance between them.”( Satani, 2003) Advanced science and technology enabled us to see the photographs of the planet earth from space which “generated reactions of awe, connectedness and mutual dependency among people on earth — a heightened awareness of the relationship between humanity and the planet, and the need to live in harmony with one another and our environment.” Once we accept the perceptive of this organic and interconnected world, we can and have to think in terms of a positive definition of peace.(D'armour, 1988) in (Satani, 2004)
PEACE-KEEPING
Peace-keeping, like the other conflict resolution instruments, is hard to define and may be intended by different users to mean different things. Due to the diversity of operations being described and the familiarity and resonance of the word itself, Peace-keeping is used to encompass a wide range of missions that often include peace-building and diplomatic peace-making components ( Ratner, 1996: James, 1990)
But in essence, the main function of Peace-keeping is to facilitate the transition from a state of conflicts to a state of peace: this has earned it the appellation 'a half-way house between peace and war'. Peace-keeping rests on three principles that are political through and through. It requires that peace-keepers : maintain the consent of the host state(s) and immediate parties to the dispute, act impartially and behave in a non-violent and non-threatening manner (James, 1990)
These principles emerged during the Cold War and have remained relevant. Cold War Peace-keeping usually involved military forces (either individual officers or formed units ) under United Nations (UN ) who monitored force separations or ceasefires. With few exceptions, they were positioned between belligerents who had agreed to stop fighting and to accept the presence of the United Nations' force. Peace-keepers were deployed to stabilize hotspots, defuse tension and help resolve disputes but they risked being drawn into the conflict, if the three principles were not observed. Since the Cold War, the first two principles -consent and impartiality -have generally being respected by third party interveners: but the third, non-threatening behaviour, is somewhat less in evidence in more robust missions such as the NATO Stabilization Force (1996- present ) in Bosnia Herzegovina and the International Stabilization Assistance Force (2002-present ) in Afghanistan.( Dawson, 2004)
THE LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR
Photo Credit: Gettyimages.
The roots of Liberia’s civil war, and it’s consequences for children, go as far back to the country’s founding. Liberia was founded in 1847 by freed American slaves. The new settlers, known as Americo-Liberians for 133 years, subsequently controlled the republic. They ran their new country like a colony, establishing a feudal structure with all social, economic, and political power in their hands. In the name of this Christianizing and civilizing mission, the indigenous population—who outnumbered their colonists by twenty to one—were subjected to a wave of abuse, including forced labor, disenfranchisement, and exclusion from the coastal, enclave community, all of which led to their impoverishment and cultural alienation while the ruling class prospered.
By the 1970s, however, this once unassailable power structure was beginning to show sign of crumbling as a new constituency of disaffected, often foreign educated, Liberians, as well as schools of indigenous technocrats, joined forces in various opposition groups and began voicing their demands for reform. Their dissatisfaction culminated in 1979 with the “rice riots,” a 2000-strong protest, sparked off by a 50 percent increase in the local staple, which turned to mayhem when police began firing into the crowd, killing more than one hundred protestors. It was growing discontent that paved the way in 1980 for the military coup that brought Samuel Doe, a Krahn from Tuzon, to power. Although he himself later became a symbol for greed and corruption, the new president’s bloody debut was initially welcomed by the majority of Liberians as an end to more than a century of colonization.
The years that followed were marked by mounting unrest due to an increasingly Krahn-dominated authoritarian regime that promoted the joint militarization and ethnically based politics and reigned over a sagging economy characterized by bourgeoning inflation and growing unemployment. Against this background, the other ethnic cliques began plotting their own rise to power, culminating in 1985 with a brutally suppressed coup attempt by Thomas Quiqonkpa, an ethnic Gio from Nimba County. After murdering Quiwonkpa, Doe’s soldiers, the Krahn dominated Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) began a bloody campaign of reprisal killings, mainly targeted at Gios and Manos, a closely related group that resides in the same region of Liberia.
Most recently, over the last fourteen years, Liberians have known little but warfare. The conflict began in December of 1989 when rebel leader Charles Taylor invaded Nimba County from the Ivory Coast. They called themselves the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). The AFL responded with a ruthless counterinsurgency campaign, indiscriminately killing civilians, burning villages, raping women, and looting. In response, NPFL ranks swelled with the long-victimized Gios and Manos, many of whom were boys orphaned during the waves of reprisal killings or simply enraged by the attacks against their people. Meanwhile, the NPFL was conducting its own reign of terror on civilians and suspected supporters of the Doe regime, primarily members of the Krahn and Maningon group. By 1990, the rebel group had over-taken every military position except Monrovia and the capital city of Liberia.
What ensued was a slow burning seven years of war fuelled by the formation of one ethnic-based rival group after another. By 1992, the NPFL splinter group, the Independent National Patriotic Front (INFL), which captured and killed Doe, had already reached its zenith and faded. But the United Liberation Movement for Democracy (ULIMO), formed by Liberian refugees in Sierra Leone who had been loyal to Doe, were making gains from across the border into southwestern Liberia. In 1993, the Liberia Peace Council (LPC), a largely Krahn offshoot of the AFL, challenged the NPFL and gained significant control over the southeast.
From 1989-1997, there were numerous failed efforts to bring the country into peace. These eight years are marked by the blood of brutal ethnic killings and massive abuses against the civilian population. Thousands of Liberian men, women, and children were killed and subject to torture, beatings, rape, and sexual assault. According to a report by Human Rights Watch, “[this abuse] resulted in massive displacement inside and outside the country. Although the conflict was rooted in historical grievances stretching back more than 100 years, the brutal tactics employed from 1989 to 1997 including the targeting of particular ethnic groups by Taylor’s NFPL, the AFL, and later the ULIMO were previously unknown in Liberian history” Finally, in 1997, a ceasefire was negotiated. Soon after, Charles Taylor, the former head of the NPFL, was elected president of the country.
Unfortunately, the Taylor government was rife with corruption and abuse, further widening the divisions and deepening popular resentments caused by civil war. State power was regularly used for the personal enrichment of government officials with little or no accountability to the Liberian citizenry. The LURD incursion from Guinea, which began in 2000, was the fifth serious outbreak of violence in Liberia since Taylor’s election and launched Liberia back into four more years of civil warfare. In August 2003, a negotiated ceasefire, the departure of Charles Taylor from office and the country, and the deployment of regional and later international peacekeepers have brought an end to major conflict, although fighting and human rights abuses persist in areas outside the U.N.’s control.( Human Rights Watch, 1997)
Chaos consumed Liberia for almost eight months before its neighboring states decided on, rather were forced into, active intervention. Liberia had a turbulent history, and in a region known for turmoil it was relatively easy for its neighbors to expect that Liberia's problems eventually would work themselves out. Liberia's fragility as a state emanated from its 1847 creation by freed American slaves.( Nelson, 1984) The founders, commonly known as Americo-Liberians, created a strict, hierarchical social system, placing themselves at the apex and the indigenous populations at the bottom. Although they only represented an approximate five percent of the population, for almost a century and a half they wielded political and economic control of the entire country.( Ero, 1995) The reign of the Americo-Liberians reached its culminating point during the 1971-1980 presidency of William Tolbert. Tolbert ascended to power following the death of President William Tubman, Liberia's strong man from 1944-1971. Tolbert was Tubman's vice president, and their combined thirty-six year rule brought only modest improvements to the lives of ordinary Liberians.( Ibid, 1995) Discontent flourished under Tolbert’s reign, which was characterized by corruption and harassment. A crackdown on anti-Tolbert, Americo-Liberian elites and riots in 1979 over the price and availability rice, a staple for all Liberians, further paved the way for political upheaval.( Adibe, 1996) In 1980, Samuel Doe, a 28-year old Master Sergeant in the Liberian National Guard, led a coup d'état. Doe and his followers stormed the executive mansion, assassinated President Tolbert and his immediate security forces, and formed a revolutionary government.(Ibid, 1996) Subsequent executions of leading political figures and government officials effectively ended AmericoLiberian dominance. The Krahns, Doe's group and another ethic minority, assumed the position once held by Americo-Liberians in Liberia's social structure. Doe ruled with a heavy hand and
Samuel Doe.Photo credit: Amazon.com
PEACE-KEEPING INTERVENTION IN LIBERIA: ECOWAS-ECOMOG INTERVENTION
On May 28, 1975, heads of state and government of fifteen West African countries--Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo--convened in Lagos to sign the treaty establishing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).(ECOWAS, 1993) Cape Verde joined the body two years later in 1977, bringing ECOWAS membership to its current composition of sixteen nations.(US State Department, 1996) ECOWAS, as the African leaders envisioned it, would foster the development of an economic union in the subregion to "raise the living standards of its peoples, and to [sic] maintain and enhance economic stability, foster relations among Member States and contribute to the progress and development of the African Continent."(ECOWAS, 1993) ECOWAS goals included the harmonization of national polices, increased integration, common environmental protection policies, the creation of joint enterprises, the formation of a common market, adoption of uniform trade policies, and the standardization of legal practices.(Ibid, 1993) Twenty-four years after its creation, the Community has a scant list of achievements: liberal immigration and travel policies, free movement of some consumer goods; construction of "highways" between Lagos and Nouakchott and between Dakar and N'djamena, which is not an ECOWAS member; and harmonization of drug control laws despite ineffective measures to stem the transit of narcotics.(ECOWAS, 1998) ECOWAS also launched a traveler's check, an initiative they hope will lead to the formation of a single monetary zone.(Ejime, 1998) These few successes would have occurred as a result of the region's porous borders, the straddling of national boundaries by ethnic groups and families, close ties among some heads of state, or out of necessity. Despite some minor successes, as an economic body ECOWAS has achieved few of its goals. ECOWAS Executive Secretary Lansana Kouyate readily admits that the Community has not met the expectations of its constituency.(Idem, 1998) Accordingly, the ECOWAS Secretariat continues to list among its primary challenges and aspirations the creation of a single monetary zone, increased private sector involvement in the region, and the harmonization of economic/financial policies and commercial laws.(ECOWAS, 1998) During the October 1998 ECOWAS summit, Kouayte renewed his appeal for increased regional cooperation on economic matters, stressing that Community should model itself after the European Union and strive for greater economic and political concord.(Ibid, 1998)
The reasons for ECOWAS's apparent failure as an economic body are numerous. In 1975 and still today, there continue to be great disparities in the wealth and development of member states. Oil-rich Nigeria, despite a long history of political uncertainty, is the economic powerhouse of the region: both Nigeria's population and Gross National Product more than double those of all the other ECOWAS states combined.(Howe, 1997)
Poverty plagues the region and of the sixteen states in West Africa, the United Nations Development Program ranks fourteen as low in human development.(UNDP, 1998) Of the 174 countries assessed in 1998, the bottom four are all West African: Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Sierra Leone.(Ibid, 1998) West African countries are typically rich in natural resources; however, their conversion of these resources to economic prosperity remains elusive. Member countries either have failed to tap this potential source of wealth or have squandered it, and thus generally remain poor and in need of development and humanitarian assistance.(ECOWAS, 1997) The poorest have little to bring to a regional bargaining table. In addition to the rift created by differing levels of development, language continues to divide West Africa. Almost forty years after independence from the colonial powers, tensions persist between the nine Francophone and the five Anglophone nations. In an attempt to rectify the colonial legacies, ECOWAS adopted French, English, and Portuguese as the Community’s official languages. For further balance, chairmanship of the body traditionally alternates between the Francophone and Anglophone countries. Until the 1988 attempted coup d'état in GuineaBissau, it and the other Lusophone state, Cape Verde, had little impact on regional programs and activities. Language barriers, varying levels of economic and social development, the lack of a common currency and differing styles of governance--military dictatorships; experiments with Marxism and socialism; quasi-success and several failures in instituting democratic practices-served as obstacles to the formation of a common market and economic integration. These conditions and pervasive intrastate political and social problems persuaded member states to look inward. As a result, West African states concentrated more on their individual situations than they did on developments in the region. That is, they did until the collapse of Liberia and its ramifications proved too significant to ignore. While ECOWAS members struggled to resolve the conflict in Liberia and curtail the spread of instability, they neglected aspects of their economic agenda, including deficit reduction, food security, and inflation management.(Ibid, 1997) Mali and Ghana even suggested that economic goals were being held hostage while the Community pursued other objectives.
Initially, international response to the crisis in Liberia was muted. In 1990, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent Gulf War captured headlines. Both the United States and the United Nations declined to intervene in restoring security to Liberia, advocating "African solutions to African problems."(Whippman, 1993] West Africa was on its own. Individual states and various African leaders, in the early days of the conflict, invoked regional agreements, appealing for but never achieving a cease-fire or negotiated settlement. This approach conformed to standing African practices. Negotiation, mediation, conciliation, and arbitration were the preferred means for the peaceful resolution of conflicts and were in accordance with the 1963 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Charter.(OAU Charter, 1963) The OAU Charter served as guidance for the ECOWAS treaty
which decreed: •
Non-aggression between Member States. •
Maintenance of regional peace, stability and security through the promotion and strengthening of good neighborliness. •
Peaceful settlement of disputes among Member States, active co- operation between neighboring countries, and promotion of a peaceful environment.[30] These non-violent methods failed in Liberia, and by May 1990 its neighbors were desperate. The fighting affected regional trade and tourism, produced hundreds of thousands of refugees, and threatened to spill over into the border states. Under extreme pressure from Guinea and Sierra Leone, ECOWAS heads of states formed a five-member Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) comprised of representatives from the Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Togo, and tasked it to identify a peaceful solution to the crisis.( Howe, 1997) The Committee's initial attempts to negotiate a cease-fire were thwarted by Doe's refusal to step down. Other tactics, such as imposing travel restrictions, freezing assets located outside of Liberia, and restricting rebel use of sovereign territories for training fighters and for staging bases, were equally useless. Taylor and the emerging rebel factions were more interested in gaining ground and political power than in negotiating a solution to the conflict. When the SMC failed to forge a peace settlement, ECOWAS reluctantly concluded intervention was necessary. Despite some opposition to intervention, during a two-day meeting in July 1990 in Sierra Leone, the ECOWAS sub-committee on Defense drew up a plan for a military intervention force.( Adibe, 1998) The SMC states met again in August and adopted the "ECOWAS Peace Plan for Liberia" which ordered the formation of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group in Liberia (ECOMOG).(Ibid, 1998) On August 23, 1990, only a few weeks later, 3,500 troops from Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Gambia deployed to Liberia. Their mission was peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance and their tasks included: •
Imposition of a cease-fire. •
Disarmament of the warring parties. •
Ending the carnage of civilians. •
Imposition of an embargo on the acquisition and import of arms. • Establishment of an interim government and preparation for elections. • Evacuation of foreign nationals.[Ibid, 1998)] ECOMOG forces immediately seized the capital Monrovia and were able to enforce a temporary cease-fire. Taylor, angered by what he considered to be an attack on Liberia's sovereignty, led his rebels in a violent counter-attack. ECOMOG, in defending itself, changed from a humanitarian body into a political-military force. This new role became even more apparent when regional peacekeepers went on the offensive following the capture of Doe outside of ECOMOG headquarters by a rebel group.( Whippman, 1993) The transformation was complete after ECOMOG helped to install an interim government in Monrovia. Simultaneously, Taylor formed his own "government" in Gbarnga. These two acts effectively divided Liberia and forced ECOMOG to choose sides. As the only protector of the interim government and the opportunity for peace that it offered, ECOMOG forces had no option but to remain in Liberia as peacemakers, not peacekeepers.
For the next seven years, ECOMOG was the only source of stability in Liberia. Ironically, there was little concert within the peacemaking force and its regional sponsor, as member states debated the mandate and management of the force. Yet, as the conflict persisted, the ECOMOG presence enlarged. At its peak, the combined West African force comprised more than 10,000 troops, and included soldiers from the first five countries to deploy as well as from Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Senegal, and Benin.( Adeyemi, 1997) Côte d'Ivoire contributed a medical team, and some of the smaller states made modest financial contributions. As the civil war endured and the force size grew, ECOMOG's role and mission also changed. Observers reported as many as three distinct ECOMOGs during the Liberian conflict.[37] The ECOMOGs varied according to the character traits of the force commanders and the political will of West African heads of state. In the early years of the war, ECOWAS believed a solution was on the horizon and assertively pursued peacekeeping activities. By the mid-nineties, rebels considered ECOMOG to be a party to the conflict, as self-defense and the protection of Monrovia and environs had become priorities for the West African mission. Traditional peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance, and disarmament characterized the last years of the war. Additionally, by 1995 ECOMOG had also assumed the onerous task of protecting some 160 United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) observers.(UNSC, 1995) Despite ECOMOG's multiple personalities and ever changing responsibilities, the body would facilitate thirteen peace agreements, oversee the disarmament of 24,000 combatants, create a safe environment for transparent elections, distribute ballot boxes and other election materials; and provide security for the July 1997 presidential and national elections.(US Department of State, 1998)
Looking at the players involved and the final scorecard, it appears that ECOWAS states overcame their differences in support of a common cause. In reality, preservation of the unique self-interests of the West African states propelled them to work together to resolve the Liberia crisis. The desire to curb the suffering and the spread of anarchy was a close second. Security was a critical issue as crime rates in Liberia's border states soared in tandem with the influx of refugees.( ibid, 1998). Liberia's neighbors became increasingly concerned about their own peace and security as rebel groups used their territories for training and the transshipment of arms.( Ibid, 1998). West African leaders also feared they would lose the public's confidence in their abilities to govern and provide security. Ghana, Nigeria, and Guinea, whose leaders rose to power through the military, had citizens resident in Liberia. Rebel groups accused these foreign nationals of endorsing opposition factions. The civilians, regardless of their political sentiments, became targets for various rebel groups; the expatriates and citizens at home looked to their governments for protection.( May, 1998). The ramifications of the Liberian civil war touched most West African states and convinced some that action was necessary. Nevertheless, within the SMC and the larger ECOWAS community, there was no consensus on intervening in Liberia. Guinea and Sierra Leone, two of three countries bordering Liberia, joined Nigeria and became staunch proponents of military action. Both Guinea and Sierra Leone had absorbed thousands of refugees.( Whippman, 1993). Concerned about their internal stability, they were adamant that a regional effort was required. Nigeria, as the most powerful state in the region, promoted itself as the region's policeman and advocated a regional effort to restore stability. Côte d'Ivoire, another Liberian border state and safehaven for refugees, asserted that ECOWAS had gone beyond its mandate and argued that intervention would contravene the OAU charter. Senegal did not have a refugee problem but shared Côte d'Ivoire's views on adhering to the ECOWAS Treaty and the OAU Charter. SMC members Togo and Mali were not directly affected by the crisis, but remained wary of entering the fray and declined to participate in the proposed peacekeeping mission. Burkina Faso, which provided assistance to NPFL rebels and whose president had a close relationship with Taylor, vehemently decried the decision to intervene as well. The official explanation for West African intervention in Liberia was to end the senseless slaughter of Liberians and to restore stability by means of a cease-fire, an interim government, and democratic elections. A more accurate explanation is ECOWAS states recognized containing and defusing the conflict was essential to their individual survivals.
Nigeria
While most of West Africa debated the relevance of a regional peacekeeping force in Liberia, Nigeria was ready and eager to deploy. Nigeria provided the bulk of the funding, forces, military and political leadership, and materiel without which ECOMOG would not have been possible. As the self-appointed policeman of the region, Nigeria subscribed to ending the war and restoring stability. Nevertheless, there were other factors dictating Nigerian involvement. Nigeria's prime motivation was the protection of its citizens. More than 70,000 Nigerians lived and worked in Liberia at the onset of the war.(Whippman, 1990) They became rebel targets after factions learned of an April 1990 Nigerian government shipment of light assault weapons and ammunition to Doe supporters.( Barret, 1997). Attacks against Nigerians peaked on August 8 when NPFL guerrillas murdered as many as one thousand civilians who had sought protection at the Nigerian embassy. ( Whippman, 1990). The Nigerian government had previously threatened to retaliate against rebel forces if its nationals were harmed. Following the slaughter on the sovereign grounds of the embassy, Nigeria was even more determined to take action.
Nigeria was also concerned about the possible spread of instability and what that meant to Nigerian interests in the region. Some of Nigeria's closest allies at the time, the Gambia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea, were all dangerously close to Liberia and directly threatened by the chaos. The growing refugee population was only one menace to regional stability. Dissidents from the Gambia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone had joined Taylor's forces and there was a general fear they would take his struggle to their homelands. In preventing the destabilization of the Gambia, Guinea and Sierra Leone, Nigeria assured itself of partners during a period when it was faced growing criticism for domestic human rights abuses and political repression. (Adibe, 1996)
Nigeria had another ally it wished to protect. Although there were occasional tense periods, Liberia had been a close, supportive English-speaking associate in an area dominated by Francophones. Doe and Nigerian President Ibrahim Babangida had a personal relationship, and Doe even ordered that one of the University of Liberia's schools and a highway be named after Banbagida. To reciprocate, Babangida assisted in rescheduling some of Liberia's external debts and made a donation to the university.( Adibe, 1996) The loss of Liberian support would have been a severe blow to Nigerian influence in the region.
Mali
While Nigeria was unwavering on the need for regional action in Liberia, other states were not as convinced. When ECOWAS decided to send troops to Liberia, Mali initially objected, citing the ECOWAS Treaty and the principle of non-intervention. However, there was more to Mali's opposition than concern about treaty violations. In the early 1990s, Mali's domestic situation was precarious and required the full attention of the government and the military's capabilities. As Liberia succumbed to domestic and political discontent, in Mali, dictator Moussa Traoré also struggled to maintain control. In Bamako and other cities, students and opposition politicians staged pro-democracy demonstrations, and Traoré used Mali's military forces to occasionally put down protests. Concurrently, in Mali's arid and extremely underdeveloped northern regions, Tuareg nomads staged a rebellion and demanded autonomy. The Traoré Government was ruthless in quelling the Tuareg uprising, often using excessive military force.( Keita, 1996) Mali's outlook changed in 1991 when students and soldiers drove Traoré from office. He was replaced by a democratically-elected civilian president, Alpha Omar Konaré, who was an avowed internationalist, philosopher, and strong advocate for regional peace and stability. After negotiating a peace settlement with Tuareg groups and integrating some of the former combatants into the armed forces, he turned his attention to conflict resolution. Malian forces were dispatched to peacekeeping efforts in Rwanda, Haiti, and the Central African Republic and in 1996, Konaré committed 600 troops to the regional effort in Liberia.(Diarrah,1999)
Konaré's contribution was a reflection of his desire to return peace and security not only to the region, but also to Mali. The legacy of Traoré's military dictatorship was a powerful, competent military. By offering peacekeepers to ECOMOG as well as to other combined operations, Konaré was able to occupy supporters of the former regime, who if left idle at home, might attempt to derail his nascent government.(Ibid, 1999) Mali's interests in regional security were more than a desire to control the impact of Liberian instability on West Africa. Mali's involvement in ECOMOG was an attempt to curb Nigerian hegemony. Nigeria already dominated ECOMOG, and President Sani Abacha, Babangida’s successor, sought to exert greater influence over ECOWAS. He used extreme measures and coerced West African states into electing him as ECOWAS chairman. Mali had been in line for the ECOWAS leadership position, but Konaré earned Abacha's wrath when his government co-sponsored a United Nations Resolution condemning Nigeria for human rights abuses. Although Mali's meager troop contribution was no match for the thousands of soldiers sent by Nigeria, Malian participation sent a clear message to Nigeria and other ECOWAS members: regardless of ECOMOG composition, the peacekeeping mission would reflect a regional endeavor. Tensions between Mali and Nigeria were typical of the Francophone/Anglophone divide and the French-speakers determination to limit Nigeria's reach.
Niger
Like Mali, Niger sent peacekeepers to Liberia to keep the peace at home and to capture Nigeria's attention. In the early 1990's, there was extreme political uncertainty in Niger as party leaders of its "cohabitation" government were constantly at odds. Falling uranium prices from its principal export led to inflation and unemployment. Again like Mali, Niger also confronted a Tuareg rebellion in its north. When ECOMOG first deployed, Niger's government could not afford the luxury of contributing troops to the regional operation when they were needed to enforce domestic security. In 1996 the military overthrew the democratic, civilian government in a bloodless coup d'état, and the new president, Ibrahim Baré, looked differently at intervention in Liberia. Above all, he needed a way to keep the troops busy. Rebel incidents in the north had subsided, lessening the need for an enhanced military presence. Additionally, not all members of the armed forces supported the coup, and some remained loyal to the former president even though Baré was a military officer. The military was also disgruntled over nonpayment of their salaries. As in the case of Mali, offering troops to ECOMOG would likely thwart efforts by the elements of the military to wreak havoc at home. Baré further hoped that by contributing troops, he would burnish his image with the international community which criticized his regime for the coup, human rights abuses, and political oppression. Baré was also very close to Abacha and sought ways to forge closer ties to its southern neighbor. Nigeria appreciated the support of another Francophone nation and in 1997 transported as well as financed the small Nigerien contingent deployed to Liberia.
Senegal
Despite having professional military and an active peacekeeping history, Senegal was extremely wary about participating in the ECOMOG operation.(Mortimer, 1998) Unlike Guinea and Sierra Leone, Senegal did not have a refugee problem, and unlike Nigeria, there was not a large Senegalese population in Liberia. At the outbreak of the Liberian war, Senegal did not face the type of domestic uncertainty which challenged Mali and Niger. Already a respected member of the African and international community, Senegal was not searching for greater recognition. As a result, Senegal turned its attention to the Middle East, where it had contributed forces to the Gulf War coalition. Eventually, both domestic and regional politics influenced Senegalese participation in, as well as early withdrawal from, the peacekeeping exercise.
Senegal's perspective on its intervention in Liberia began to change towards the end of Desert Storm when President Abdou Diouf succumbed to internal and external pressures to become more involved. Domestically, Diouf had formed a coalition government and needed highlevel positions for his political opponents. He created a new ministry for regional integration, and a political rival assumed the position as minister.( Ibid, 1998). This new ministry also enhanced Senegal's ability to play a greater leadership role in regional development and integration, which were Diouf’s goals for his impending tenure as ECOWAS chairman. Although economic issues topped Diouf’s agenda for ECOWAS, it would be difficult to escape Senegalese participation in regional peacekeeping. (Ibid, 1998)
Externally, both Charles Taylor and the United States encouraged Senegal to contribute to the peacekeeping force. Taylor repeatedly expressed his distrust of Nigerian forces, hinting he would have his rebels lay down their arms to a peacekeeping force more representative of the region, or to the Senegalese.(Ibid, 1998) Such a promise suggested that Liberia's future and the stability of the region depended on Senegal. The United States, a longtime friend of Senegal, placed even more pressure on the Diouf government. During Diouf's September 1991 state visit to the United States, President George Bush and Secretary of State James Baker urged Diouf to send troops to Liberia, even pledging U.S. financial support for peacekeeping operations.(Ibid, 1998) Senegal eventually committed 1,500 troops, and the first deployment arrived in late October.
Senegalese forces, however, would not remain in Liberia for long. Reneging on his earlier promise, Taylor did not instruct his forces to lay down their arms. On the contrary, Senegalese peacekeepers came under attack by NPFL fighters and six were killed. The Senegalese public, which had opposed the peacekeeping operation, called for the withdrawal of the military. Coincidentally, as the situation in Liberia became more precarious, security within Senegal began to erode. Dissidents in the Casamance region renewed their armed opposition against the Government, and military forces were required to maintain peace and protect the civilian population. As a result of the twin threats, Senegal redeployed its forces in January 1993, but would continue to be an active participant in the peace process.
Burkina Faso
Burkina Faso, like Mali and Niger, was a latecomer to regional peacekeeping efforts. As was the case with Nigeria, Burkina had specific interests in Liberia. Burkinabé President Blaise Compaoré was not ambivalent about regional involvement in Liberia and domestic politics did not influence his stance. Publicly, Compaoré opposed intervention, citing the OAU Charter and the ECOWAS Treaty on state sovereignty. Privately, Compaoré had close ties to Taylor and supported his quest for power. Burkina also sought to limit the Nigerian sphere of influence, and a Taylor rather than a Doe government would help to check Nigerian domination of the region.[ Diarrah,1999) in ( Brown, 1999)
Compaoré's support for Taylor stemmed from a variety of complex reasons. At the core were personal relationships. President Compaoré was the son-in-law of Ivorian President Felix Houphouet-Boigny. Houphouet’s daughter, before her marriage to Compaoré, had been married to the late son of former Liberian President Tolbert. The Doe regime assassinated the Tolberts, and Houphouet was eager to avenge the death of his former son-in-law and see a "more friendly" government in power.[Lowenkopf, 1995) He requested and received Compaoré’s willing assistance. Burkina Faso opened its territory to the NPFL and Taylor sent and received arms and other supplies through Burkina Faso, aided by elements of the Compaoré Government.( Browne, 1999). In addition, Taylor established training camps in Burkina, and Burkinabé mercenaries also fought alongside NPFL rebels.( Asante, 1997). Burkina's staunch support for Taylor would make it difficult for the region and the international community to accept its eventual participation in ECOMOG.
President Compaoré began to modify his position in the mid 1990s as he prepared for a one-year term as chairman of the Organization of African Unity. As head of an organization that promoted peace, it would be unseemly for the Burkinabé to openly support Taylor and the NPFL. Compaoré further hoped that offering forces to ECOMOG would elevate his international standing. Still, there continued to be credible reports of assistance to Taylor and his rebels despite Burkinabé protestations to the contrary.( Ibid, 1999)
In 1997 Burkina Faso pledged 350 troops to the peacekeeping operation; however, its past history made deployment challenging. Western donors did not offer the airlift provided to other ECOWAS states, and Nigeria, which transported Nigerien soldiers to Liberia, did not step forward. Burkina Faso’s commercial airline flew Burkinabé troops to Liberia. Nevertheless, ECOMOG, remained convinced that Burkina Faso supported Taylor and forbade Burkinabé troops from deploying in NPFL-controlled areas, requiring them to patrol with Nigerian units.[Idem, 1998] in ( Brown, 1999) Even as Burkina Faso's military reportedly performed well in Liberia, speculation about Comparoré's real intentions for providing a contingent lingered.
Ghana
Ghana was more forthright than the other ECOWAS nations about its participation in the ECOMOG peacekeeping operation. Ghana provided safe-haven to a large community of Liberians who fled the violence, but maintained that ECOMOG was primarily about member states, not Liberia and regional security. Then Foreign Minister Obed Asamoah, publicly explained that "the Liberian situation assumed international dimensions because several thousand Ghanaians, Nigerians and other nationals [had] been holed up in Liberia and [were] suffering because of the fighting."( Adibe, 1996) Protection of the 10,000 Ghanaians in Liberia was the immediate concern. However, Ghana provided troops to ECOMOG, because it considered itself an island of stability in a tumultuous and unpredictable area and believed it could assist in restoring stability. Ghana brought political impartiality and extensive peacekeeping experience to the regional endeavor. Unlike Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, and Burkina Faso, Ghana did not have a political stake in the outcome of the Liberian civil war. President Jerry John Rawlings believed Ghana could be an honest broker in negotiating a peaceful settlement and would serve as a counter-balance to Nigeria.( Brown, 1999) However, for Ghana it was not just Nigeria's political ambitions that were intractable. The Rawlings Government deemed Nigerian forces to be poorly disciplined and did not want them running amok in the region.( Idem) in (Brown, 1999).
In contrast, Ghana's military was exceptionally qualified for the ECOMOG security and humanitarian mission as two-thirds of Ghana's 7,500-strong military is regularly deployed to international peacekeeping operations.(Ibid, 1999). Ghanaian soldiers have participated in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) since 1978, where they honed their peacekeeping skills.( Ibid,1999) ECOWAS valued Ghana's expertise and assigned a Ghanaian, General Arnold Quainoo, as the first ECOMOG commander.(Howe, 1997) His tenure was brief due to unease between the Ghanaians and Nigerians and his passive approach to the conflict. A series of assertive Nigerians replaced him. Even under aggressive Nigerian leadership, the Ghanaians training served them well. The Ghanaian Government reported only twenty-five peacekeepers killed between October 1990 and April 1996. (Asante, 1997)
There was a broad regional commitment to restoring peace and stability to Liberia, but the West African states that contributed forces to ECOMOG had ulterior motives. Self-aggrandizement and internal, rather than regional, security motivated ECOWAS states. These reasons were not compatible with the ECOWAS mission and undermined the cooperative spirit of the peacekeeping initiative. Lack of a shared commitment to regional goals will only hinder future efforts to promote economic integration and regional stability.
Conclusion
Having discussed the Liberian Civil War with its serious humanitarian consequences, it suffices to conclude that "While the civil war itself has been devastating, it has brought about other problems, many of which continue to the present day. There has been a deterioration of national government authority, mass population movements, macro-economic failure, and food insecurity. The above five characteristics are the hallmarks of what has been called complex humanitarian emergencies, which affected at least 1.5 million people in Liberia, according to 1996 estimates. The Liberian experience was a most harrowing one, with many lessons learnt but it served to establish the strength and leadership role of Nigeria and ECOMOG in the West African sub-region and the efficiency of ECOWAS itself. ( Rabi, 2001)
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The reasons for ECOWAS's apparent failure as an economic body are numerous. In 1975 and still today, there continue to be great disparities in the wealth and development of member states. Oil-rich Nigeria, despite a long history of political uncertainty, is the economic powerhouse of the region: both Nigeria's population and Gross National Product more than double those of all the other ECOWAS states combined.(Howe, 1997)
Poverty plagues the region and of the sixteen states in West Africa, the United Nations Development Program ranks fourteen as low in human development.(UNDP, 1998) Of the 174 countries assessed in 1998, the bottom four are all West African: Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Sierra Leone.(Ibid, 1998) West African countries are typically rich in natural resources; however, their conversion of these resources to economic prosperity remains elusive. Member countries either have failed to tap this potential source of wealth or have squandered it, and thus generally remain poor and in need of development and humanitarian assistance.(ECOWAS, 1997) The poorest have little to bring to a regional bargaining table. In addition to the rift created by differing levels of development, language continues to divide West Africa. Almost forty years after independence from the colonial powers, tensions persist between the nine Francophone and the five Anglophone nations. In an attempt to rectify the colonial legacies, ECOWAS adopted French, English, and Portuguese as the Community’s official languages. For further balance, chairmanship of the body traditionally alternates between the Francophone and Anglophone countries. Until the 1988 attempted coup d'état in GuineaBissau, it and the other Lusophone state, Cape Verde, had little impact on regional programs and activities. Language barriers, varying levels of economic and social development, the lack of a common currency and differing styles of governance--military dictatorships; experiments with Marxism and socialism; quasi-success and several failures in instituting democratic practices-served as obstacles to the formation of a common market and economic integration. These conditions and pervasive intrastate political and social problems persuaded member states to look inward. As a result, West African states concentrated more on their individual situations than they did on developments in the region. That is, they did until the collapse of Liberia and its ramifications proved too significant to ignore. While ECOWAS members struggled to resolve the conflict in Liberia and curtail the spread of instability, they neglected aspects of their economic agenda, including deficit reduction, food security, and inflation management.(Ibid, 1997) Mali and Ghana even suggested that economic goals were being held hostage while the Community pursued other objectives.
Initially, international response to the crisis in Liberia was muted. In 1990, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent Gulf War captured headlines. Both the United States and the United Nations declined to intervene in restoring security to Liberia, advocating "African solutions to African problems."(Whippman, 1993] West Africa was on its own. Individual states and various African leaders, in the early days of the conflict, invoked regional agreements, appealing for but never achieving a cease-fire or negotiated settlement. This approach conformed to standing African practices. Negotiation, mediation, conciliation, and arbitration were the preferred means for the peaceful resolution of conflicts and were in accordance with the 1963 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Charter.(OAU Charter, 1963) The OAU Charter served as guidance for the ECOWAS treaty
which decreed: •
Non-aggression between Member States. •
Maintenance of regional peace, stability and security through the promotion and strengthening of good neighborliness. •
Peaceful settlement of disputes among Member States, active co- operation between neighboring countries, and promotion of a peaceful environment.[30] These non-violent methods failed in Liberia, and by May 1990 its neighbors were desperate. The fighting affected regional trade and tourism, produced hundreds of thousands of refugees, and threatened to spill over into the border states. Under extreme pressure from Guinea and Sierra Leone, ECOWAS heads of states formed a five-member Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) comprised of representatives from the Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Togo, and tasked it to identify a peaceful solution to the crisis.( Howe, 1997) The Committee's initial attempts to negotiate a cease-fire were thwarted by Doe's refusal to step down. Other tactics, such as imposing travel restrictions, freezing assets located outside of Liberia, and restricting rebel use of sovereign territories for training fighters and for staging bases, were equally useless. Taylor and the emerging rebel factions were more interested in gaining ground and political power than in negotiating a solution to the conflict. When the SMC failed to forge a peace settlement, ECOWAS reluctantly concluded intervention was necessary. Despite some opposition to intervention, during a two-day meeting in July 1990 in Sierra Leone, the ECOWAS sub-committee on Defense drew up a plan for a military intervention force.( Adibe, 1998) The SMC states met again in August and adopted the "ECOWAS Peace Plan for Liberia" which ordered the formation of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group in Liberia (ECOMOG).(Ibid, 1998) On August 23, 1990, only a few weeks later, 3,500 troops from Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Gambia deployed to Liberia. Their mission was peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance and their tasks included: •
Imposition of a cease-fire. •
Disarmament of the warring parties. •
Ending the carnage of civilians. •
Imposition of an embargo on the acquisition and import of arms. • Establishment of an interim government and preparation for elections. • Evacuation of foreign nationals.[Ibid, 1998)] ECOMOG forces immediately seized the capital Monrovia and were able to enforce a temporary cease-fire. Taylor, angered by what he considered to be an attack on Liberia's sovereignty, led his rebels in a violent counter-attack. ECOMOG, in defending itself, changed from a humanitarian body into a political-military force. This new role became even more apparent when regional peacekeepers went on the offensive following the capture of Doe outside of ECOMOG headquarters by a rebel group.( Whippman, 1993) The transformation was complete after ECOMOG helped to install an interim government in Monrovia. Simultaneously, Taylor formed his own "government" in Gbarnga. These two acts effectively divided Liberia and forced ECOMOG to choose sides. As the only protector of the interim government and the opportunity for peace that it offered, ECOMOG forces had no option but to remain in Liberia as peacemakers, not peacekeepers.
For the next seven years, ECOMOG was the only source of stability in Liberia. Ironically, there was little concert within the peacemaking force and its regional sponsor, as member states debated the mandate and management of the force. Yet, as the conflict persisted, the ECOMOG presence enlarged. At its peak, the combined West African force comprised more than 10,000 troops, and included soldiers from the first five countries to deploy as well as from Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Senegal, and Benin.( Adeyemi, 1997) Côte d'Ivoire contributed a medical team, and some of the smaller states made modest financial contributions. As the civil war endured and the force size grew, ECOMOG's role and mission also changed. Observers reported as many as three distinct ECOMOGs during the Liberian conflict.[37] The ECOMOGs varied according to the character traits of the force commanders and the political will of West African heads of state. In the early years of the war, ECOWAS believed a solution was on the horizon and assertively pursued peacekeeping activities. By the mid-nineties, rebels considered ECOMOG to be a party to the conflict, as self-defense and the protection of Monrovia and environs had become priorities for the West African mission. Traditional peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance, and disarmament characterized the last years of the war. Additionally, by 1995 ECOMOG had also assumed the onerous task of protecting some 160 United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) observers.(UNSC, 1995) Despite ECOMOG's multiple personalities and ever changing responsibilities, the body would facilitate thirteen peace agreements, oversee the disarmament of 24,000 combatants, create a safe environment for transparent elections, distribute ballot boxes and other election materials; and provide security for the July 1997 presidential and national elections.(US Department of State, 1998)
Looking at the players involved and the final scorecard, it appears that ECOWAS states overcame their differences in support of a common cause. In reality, preservation of the unique self-interests of the West African states propelled them to work together to resolve the Liberia crisis. The desire to curb the suffering and the spread of anarchy was a close second. Security was a critical issue as crime rates in Liberia's border states soared in tandem with the influx of refugees.( ibid, 1998). Liberia's neighbors became increasingly concerned about their own peace and security as rebel groups used their territories for training and the transshipment of arms.( Ibid, 1998). West African leaders also feared they would lose the public's confidence in their abilities to govern and provide security. Ghana, Nigeria, and Guinea, whose leaders rose to power through the military, had citizens resident in Liberia. Rebel groups accused these foreign nationals of endorsing opposition factions. The civilians, regardless of their political sentiments, became targets for various rebel groups; the expatriates and citizens at home looked to their governments for protection.( May, 1998). The ramifications of the Liberian civil war touched most West African states and convinced some that action was necessary. Nevertheless, within the SMC and the larger ECOWAS community, there was no consensus on intervening in Liberia. Guinea and Sierra Leone, two of three countries bordering Liberia, joined Nigeria and became staunch proponents of military action. Both Guinea and Sierra Leone had absorbed thousands of refugees.( Whippman, 1993). Concerned about their internal stability, they were adamant that a regional effort was required. Nigeria, as the most powerful state in the region, promoted itself as the region's policeman and advocated a regional effort to restore stability. Côte d'Ivoire, another Liberian border state and safehaven for refugees, asserted that ECOWAS had gone beyond its mandate and argued that intervention would contravene the OAU charter. Senegal did not have a refugee problem but shared Côte d'Ivoire's views on adhering to the ECOWAS Treaty and the OAU Charter. SMC members Togo and Mali were not directly affected by the crisis, but remained wary of entering the fray and declined to participate in the proposed peacekeeping mission. Burkina Faso, which provided assistance to NPFL rebels and whose president had a close relationship with Taylor, vehemently decried the decision to intervene as well. The official explanation for West African intervention in Liberia was to end the senseless slaughter of Liberians and to restore stability by means of a cease-fire, an interim government, and democratic elections. A more accurate explanation is ECOWAS states recognized containing and defusing the conflict was essential to their individual survivals.
Nigeria
While most of West Africa debated the relevance of a regional peacekeeping force in Liberia, Nigeria was ready and eager to deploy. Nigeria provided the bulk of the funding, forces, military and political leadership, and materiel without which ECOMOG would not have been possible. As the self-appointed policeman of the region, Nigeria subscribed to ending the war and restoring stability. Nevertheless, there were other factors dictating Nigerian involvement. Nigeria's prime motivation was the protection of its citizens. More than 70,000 Nigerians lived and worked in Liberia at the onset of the war.(Whippman, 1990) They became rebel targets after factions learned of an April 1990 Nigerian government shipment of light assault weapons and ammunition to Doe supporters.( Barret, 1997). Attacks against Nigerians peaked on August 8 when NPFL guerrillas murdered as many as one thousand civilians who had sought protection at the Nigerian embassy. ( Whippman, 1990). The Nigerian government had previously threatened to retaliate against rebel forces if its nationals were harmed. Following the slaughter on the sovereign grounds of the embassy, Nigeria was even more determined to take action.
Nigeria was also concerned about the possible spread of instability and what that meant to Nigerian interests in the region. Some of Nigeria's closest allies at the time, the Gambia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea, were all dangerously close to Liberia and directly threatened by the chaos. The growing refugee population was only one menace to regional stability. Dissidents from the Gambia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone had joined Taylor's forces and there was a general fear they would take his struggle to their homelands. In preventing the destabilization of the Gambia, Guinea and Sierra Leone, Nigeria assured itself of partners during a period when it was faced growing criticism for domestic human rights abuses and political repression. (Adibe, 1996)
Nigeria had another ally it wished to protect. Although there were occasional tense periods, Liberia had been a close, supportive English-speaking associate in an area dominated by Francophones. Doe and Nigerian President Ibrahim Babangida had a personal relationship, and Doe even ordered that one of the University of Liberia's schools and a highway be named after Banbagida. To reciprocate, Babangida assisted in rescheduling some of Liberia's external debts and made a donation to the university.( Adibe, 1996) The loss of Liberian support would have been a severe blow to Nigerian influence in the region.
Mali
While Nigeria was unwavering on the need for regional action in Liberia, other states were not as convinced. When ECOWAS decided to send troops to Liberia, Mali initially objected, citing the ECOWAS Treaty and the principle of non-intervention. However, there was more to Mali's opposition than concern about treaty violations. In the early 1990s, Mali's domestic situation was precarious and required the full attention of the government and the military's capabilities. As Liberia succumbed to domestic and political discontent, in Mali, dictator Moussa Traoré also struggled to maintain control. In Bamako and other cities, students and opposition politicians staged pro-democracy demonstrations, and Traoré used Mali's military forces to occasionally put down protests. Concurrently, in Mali's arid and extremely underdeveloped northern regions, Tuareg nomads staged a rebellion and demanded autonomy. The Traoré Government was ruthless in quelling the Tuareg uprising, often using excessive military force.( Keita, 1996) Mali's outlook changed in 1991 when students and soldiers drove Traoré from office. He was replaced by a democratically-elected civilian president, Alpha Omar Konaré, who was an avowed internationalist, philosopher, and strong advocate for regional peace and stability. After negotiating a peace settlement with Tuareg groups and integrating some of the former combatants into the armed forces, he turned his attention to conflict resolution. Malian forces were dispatched to peacekeeping efforts in Rwanda, Haiti, and the Central African Republic and in 1996, Konaré committed 600 troops to the regional effort in Liberia.(Diarrah,1999)
Konaré's contribution was a reflection of his desire to return peace and security not only to the region, but also to Mali. The legacy of Traoré's military dictatorship was a powerful, competent military. By offering peacekeepers to ECOMOG as well as to other combined operations, Konaré was able to occupy supporters of the former regime, who if left idle at home, might attempt to derail his nascent government.(Ibid, 1999) Mali's interests in regional security were more than a desire to control the impact of Liberian instability on West Africa. Mali's involvement in ECOMOG was an attempt to curb Nigerian hegemony. Nigeria already dominated ECOMOG, and President Sani Abacha, Babangida’s successor, sought to exert greater influence over ECOWAS. He used extreme measures and coerced West African states into electing him as ECOWAS chairman. Mali had been in line for the ECOWAS leadership position, but Konaré earned Abacha's wrath when his government co-sponsored a United Nations Resolution condemning Nigeria for human rights abuses. Although Mali's meager troop contribution was no match for the thousands of soldiers sent by Nigeria, Malian participation sent a clear message to Nigeria and other ECOWAS members: regardless of ECOMOG composition, the peacekeeping mission would reflect a regional endeavor. Tensions between Mali and Nigeria were typical of the Francophone/Anglophone divide and the French-speakers determination to limit Nigeria's reach.
Niger
Like Mali, Niger sent peacekeepers to Liberia to keep the peace at home and to capture Nigeria's attention. In the early 1990's, there was extreme political uncertainty in Niger as party leaders of its "cohabitation" government were constantly at odds. Falling uranium prices from its principal export led to inflation and unemployment. Again like Mali, Niger also confronted a Tuareg rebellion in its north. When ECOMOG first deployed, Niger's government could not afford the luxury of contributing troops to the regional operation when they were needed to enforce domestic security. In 1996 the military overthrew the democratic, civilian government in a bloodless coup d'état, and the new president, Ibrahim Baré, looked differently at intervention in Liberia. Above all, he needed a way to keep the troops busy. Rebel incidents in the north had subsided, lessening the need for an enhanced military presence. Additionally, not all members of the armed forces supported the coup, and some remained loyal to the former president even though Baré was a military officer. The military was also disgruntled over nonpayment of their salaries. As in the case of Mali, offering troops to ECOMOG would likely thwart efforts by the elements of the military to wreak havoc at home. Baré further hoped that by contributing troops, he would burnish his image with the international community which criticized his regime for the coup, human rights abuses, and political oppression. Baré was also very close to Abacha and sought ways to forge closer ties to its southern neighbor. Nigeria appreciated the support of another Francophone nation and in 1997 transported as well as financed the small Nigerien contingent deployed to Liberia.
Senegal
Despite having professional military and an active peacekeeping history, Senegal was extremely wary about participating in the ECOMOG operation.(Mortimer, 1998) Unlike Guinea and Sierra Leone, Senegal did not have a refugee problem, and unlike Nigeria, there was not a large Senegalese population in Liberia. At the outbreak of the Liberian war, Senegal did not face the type of domestic uncertainty which challenged Mali and Niger. Already a respected member of the African and international community, Senegal was not searching for greater recognition. As a result, Senegal turned its attention to the Middle East, where it had contributed forces to the Gulf War coalition. Eventually, both domestic and regional politics influenced Senegalese participation in, as well as early withdrawal from, the peacekeeping exercise.
Senegal's perspective on its intervention in Liberia began to change towards the end of Desert Storm when President Abdou Diouf succumbed to internal and external pressures to become more involved. Domestically, Diouf had formed a coalition government and needed highlevel positions for his political opponents. He created a new ministry for regional integration, and a political rival assumed the position as minister.( Ibid, 1998). This new ministry also enhanced Senegal's ability to play a greater leadership role in regional development and integration, which were Diouf’s goals for his impending tenure as ECOWAS chairman. Although economic issues topped Diouf’s agenda for ECOWAS, it would be difficult to escape Senegalese participation in regional peacekeeping. (Ibid, 1998)
Externally, both Charles Taylor and the United States encouraged Senegal to contribute to the peacekeeping force. Taylor repeatedly expressed his distrust of Nigerian forces, hinting he would have his rebels lay down their arms to a peacekeeping force more representative of the region, or to the Senegalese.(Ibid, 1998) Such a promise suggested that Liberia's future and the stability of the region depended on Senegal. The United States, a longtime friend of Senegal, placed even more pressure on the Diouf government. During Diouf's September 1991 state visit to the United States, President George Bush and Secretary of State James Baker urged Diouf to send troops to Liberia, even pledging U.S. financial support for peacekeeping operations.(Ibid, 1998) Senegal eventually committed 1,500 troops, and the first deployment arrived in late October.
Senegalese forces, however, would not remain in Liberia for long. Reneging on his earlier promise, Taylor did not instruct his forces to lay down their arms. On the contrary, Senegalese peacekeepers came under attack by NPFL fighters and six were killed. The Senegalese public, which had opposed the peacekeeping operation, called for the withdrawal of the military. Coincidentally, as the situation in Liberia became more precarious, security within Senegal began to erode. Dissidents in the Casamance region renewed their armed opposition against the Government, and military forces were required to maintain peace and protect the civilian population. As a result of the twin threats, Senegal redeployed its forces in January 1993, but would continue to be an active participant in the peace process.
Burkina Faso
Burkina Faso, like Mali and Niger, was a latecomer to regional peacekeeping efforts. As was the case with Nigeria, Burkina had specific interests in Liberia. Burkinabé President Blaise Compaoré was not ambivalent about regional involvement in Liberia and domestic politics did not influence his stance. Publicly, Compaoré opposed intervention, citing the OAU Charter and the ECOWAS Treaty on state sovereignty. Privately, Compaoré had close ties to Taylor and supported his quest for power. Burkina also sought to limit the Nigerian sphere of influence, and a Taylor rather than a Doe government would help to check Nigerian domination of the region.[ Diarrah,1999) in ( Brown, 1999)
Compaoré's support for Taylor stemmed from a variety of complex reasons. At the core were personal relationships. President Compaoré was the son-in-law of Ivorian President Felix Houphouet-Boigny. Houphouet’s daughter, before her marriage to Compaoré, had been married to the late son of former Liberian President Tolbert. The Doe regime assassinated the Tolberts, and Houphouet was eager to avenge the death of his former son-in-law and see a "more friendly" government in power.[Lowenkopf, 1995) He requested and received Compaoré’s willing assistance. Burkina Faso opened its territory to the NPFL and Taylor sent and received arms and other supplies through Burkina Faso, aided by elements of the Compaoré Government.( Browne, 1999). In addition, Taylor established training camps in Burkina, and Burkinabé mercenaries also fought alongside NPFL rebels.( Asante, 1997). Burkina's staunch support for Taylor would make it difficult for the region and the international community to accept its eventual participation in ECOMOG.
President Compaoré began to modify his position in the mid 1990s as he prepared for a one-year term as chairman of the Organization of African Unity. As head of an organization that promoted peace, it would be unseemly for the Burkinabé to openly support Taylor and the NPFL. Compaoré further hoped that offering forces to ECOMOG would elevate his international standing. Still, there continued to be credible reports of assistance to Taylor and his rebels despite Burkinabé protestations to the contrary.( Ibid, 1999)
In 1997 Burkina Faso pledged 350 troops to the peacekeeping operation; however, its past history made deployment challenging. Western donors did not offer the airlift provided to other ECOWAS states, and Nigeria, which transported Nigerien soldiers to Liberia, did not step forward. Burkina Faso’s commercial airline flew Burkinabé troops to Liberia. Nevertheless, ECOMOG, remained convinced that Burkina Faso supported Taylor and forbade Burkinabé troops from deploying in NPFL-controlled areas, requiring them to patrol with Nigerian units.[Idem, 1998] in ( Brown, 1999) Even as Burkina Faso's military reportedly performed well in Liberia, speculation about Comparoré's real intentions for providing a contingent lingered.
Ghana
Ghana was more forthright than the other ECOWAS nations about its participation in the ECOMOG peacekeeping operation. Ghana provided safe-haven to a large community of Liberians who fled the violence, but maintained that ECOMOG was primarily about member states, not Liberia and regional security. Then Foreign Minister Obed Asamoah, publicly explained that "the Liberian situation assumed international dimensions because several thousand Ghanaians, Nigerians and other nationals [had] been holed up in Liberia and [were] suffering because of the fighting."( Adibe, 1996) Protection of the 10,000 Ghanaians in Liberia was the immediate concern. However, Ghana provided troops to ECOMOG, because it considered itself an island of stability in a tumultuous and unpredictable area and believed it could assist in restoring stability. Ghana brought political impartiality and extensive peacekeeping experience to the regional endeavor. Unlike Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, and Burkina Faso, Ghana did not have a political stake in the outcome of the Liberian civil war. President Jerry John Rawlings believed Ghana could be an honest broker in negotiating a peaceful settlement and would serve as a counter-balance to Nigeria.( Brown, 1999) However, for Ghana it was not just Nigeria's political ambitions that were intractable. The Rawlings Government deemed Nigerian forces to be poorly disciplined and did not want them running amok in the region.( Idem) in (Brown, 1999).
In contrast, Ghana's military was exceptionally qualified for the ECOMOG security and humanitarian mission as two-thirds of Ghana's 7,500-strong military is regularly deployed to international peacekeeping operations.(Ibid, 1999). Ghanaian soldiers have participated in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) since 1978, where they honed their peacekeeping skills.( Ibid,1999) ECOWAS valued Ghana's expertise and assigned a Ghanaian, General Arnold Quainoo, as the first ECOMOG commander.(Howe, 1997) His tenure was brief due to unease between the Ghanaians and Nigerians and his passive approach to the conflict. A series of assertive Nigerians replaced him. Even under aggressive Nigerian leadership, the Ghanaians training served them well. The Ghanaian Government reported only twenty-five peacekeepers killed between October 1990 and April 1996. (Asante, 1997)
There was a broad regional commitment to restoring peace and stability to Liberia, but the West African states that contributed forces to ECOMOG had ulterior motives. Self-aggrandizement and internal, rather than regional, security motivated ECOWAS states. These reasons were not compatible with the ECOWAS mission and undermined the cooperative spirit of the peacekeeping initiative. Lack of a shared commitment to regional goals will only hinder future efforts to promote economic integration and regional stability.
Conclusion
Having discussed the Liberian Civil War with its serious humanitarian consequences, it suffices to conclude that "While the civil war itself has been devastating, it has brought about other problems, many of which continue to the present day. There has been a deterioration of national government authority, mass population movements, macro-economic failure, and food insecurity. The above five characteristics are the hallmarks of what has been called complex humanitarian emergencies, which affected at least 1.5 million people in Liberia, according to 1996 estimates. The Liberian experience was a most harrowing one, with many lessons learnt but it served to establish the strength and leadership role of Nigeria and ECOMOG in the West African sub-region and the efficiency of ECOWAS itself. ( Rabi, 2001)
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